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8.  Street stops and police legitimacy in 
New York
Jeffrey Fagan, Tom R. Tyler and  
Tracey L. Meares
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Revisiting the Abner Louima Incident
Most discussions of the consequences, both positive and negative, of 
New  York City’s modern policing tactics begin with an analysis of its 
stop and frisk activity (hereafter, SQF).1 SQF was an essential feature, 
perhaps the most important and active ingredient, in the regime of Order 
Maintenance Policing (OMP) that began in New York City in 1994 
(Bratton and Knobler 1998; Silverman 1999; Maple and Mitchell 2000). 
The basic tactic under SQF is an encounter between an officer and a 
citizen, usually initiated by the officer. Under constitutional rules and 
New York case law (People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976)), for such 
encounters, known as Terry stops nationally (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968)), police can stop a citizen based on founded suspicion that crime 
may be ‘afoot’. The encounter would proceed to increasing levels of intru-
sion if suspicion was determined to be credible or reasonable. Reasonable 
suspicion would permit pointed questioning and frisk or pat down to look 
for weapons, drugs or other contraband.2
Details about how often, to whom, and where these encounters took 
place were scarce during the early years of this practice. Although most 
officers conducted these stops, an elite NYPD detail known as the Street 
Crime Unit (SCU) was the vanguard of this practice during its few years.3 
In 1997, Police Commissioner Howard Safir expanded the SCU to over 
300 officers, with SCU’s deployed in each of the five boroughs. The units 
were supervised by Borough commanders using real- time spatial informa-
tion about crime trends. Still, not much was known about SCU’s outside 
of the neighborhoods where they focused their patrols. There was little 
public discussion and little visible reaction. While residents of the City’s 
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highest crime neighborhoods were aware of the SCU’s aggressive and 
intrusive searches, not much was known outside those neighborhoods 
(Kocieniewski 1999).
But it was a very different type of police- citizen encounter that brought 
SQF to public attention, and that unleashed a great wave of anger. The 
Abner Louima incident in September 1997 happened two years before 
the 1999 fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo in a stop and frisk incident 
in the courtyard of a Bronx apartment building, and 27 months before 
the publication of the Spitzer Report in December 1999 that focused 
political and policy attention, both in New York and across the country, 
on the practice of SQF. The Louima incident had nothing to do with 
SQF. Louima, a Haitian immigrant, was arrested following an early 
morning fracas outside a nightclub in a largely immigrant enclave in 
East Flatbush in Brooklyn. He was taken to the 72nd precinct, where 
he was sodomized with the handle of a bathroom plunger by police 
officers while in custody.4 Even though this was a routine incident (until 
the assault), the publicity surrounding the incident created a political 
and social space in which the City’s minority communities expressed a 
great deal of bitterness and anger about the totality of their experiences 
with police. Evidently, this anger had been simmering for nearly three 
years  since the adoption of OMP strategies and the sharp increase in 
SQF.5
Why the anger? Certainly, the act was disgusting, and reactions 
included both visceral disgust at the thought of the act, and moral disgust 
both at the act itself and the thought that police might have done it, 
and political disgust at the attempts by the officers to conceal the act. 
Louima’s injuries, which were revealed over a period of several days 
following the incident, were severe and required multiple surgeries. He 
was hospitalized for three weeks. Throughout this time, coverage of the 
incident, including the arrests of the officers, ensured that it survived 
multiple news cycles.
But this still didn’t explain the sustained anger that arose from the 
Louima incident and spread through the City’s minority neighbor-
hoods (Kocieniewski 1999). After all, from the perspective of many 
New Yorkers, crime was falling fast, and it fell fastest in the City’s highest 
crime neighborhoods (Bratton and Knobler 1998; Zimring 2011). Those 
also were the areas with the highest concentrations of Black and Latino 
residents (Spitzer 1999). But the experience of policing in those areas up to 
that moment led to a more ambivalent and complex reaction by residents. 
These residents were the beneficiaries of the crime decline, even as they 
also were the targets of tough police tactics.
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1.2 The Liabilities of the New Policing
Instead, the Louima incident created a political and social space for the 
expression of the anger and frustration of the City’s non- White (and some 
White) residents from their increasing exposure to the new OMP policing 
in New York. The liabilities and difficulties of the new regime of street 
stops were revealed, as were the new norms for optimal or reasonable or 
fair police behavior on the street.
The Louima incident exposed at least four sources of anger. First, as 
portrayed in the Spitzer report two years later, minority citizens, especially 
Black New Yorkers, had routinely experienced frequent unwanted contact 
with the police. Although precise numbers before 1998 (and perhaps 
after) were difficult to come by, the data reported by Spitzer showed that 
stops were extensive and spatially concentrated. Second was the racial 
skew. The Spitzer report and subsequent analyses (Gelman et al. 2007; 
Fagan 2010; Fagan et al. 2010) demonstrated that there was a racial skew 
in these encounters: stop rates for Black and Latino citizens were signifi-
cantly higher relative to their known rates of crime participation than were 
comparable rates for Whites. Third, the Spitzer report showed that more 
than one in three SQF stops lacked the founded or reasonable suspicion 
that would satisfy constitutional predicates for police interdiction of citi-
zens. Fourth, the nature of the interactions was another source of anger. 
In these encounters, suspicion was strongly signaled and often explicitly 
communicated with tough language and rough treatment (Tyler et al. 
2014). Patdowns or searches of suspects’ belongings or their persons were 
common, even as arrests or other actions that might justify the intrusions 
were rare. Harsh language and threats were routine (Spitzer 1999).
The Diallo shooting less than two years later in February 1999 created 
a second cascade of anger and perhaps confirmed the initial outburst 
of anger and disgust that was unleashed toward the new policing in 
New York after Louima. Thirteen months after Diallo’s killing, the March 
2000 fatal shooting of Patrick Dorismond by undercover police officers in 
a reverse drug sting led to a third cascade of popular anger toward the new 
policing (Rosen 2000). All three victims were of African descent, further 
racializing the discourse over the new policing in New York.
These three events opened a window for questioning the algebra of 
risk and return behind these practices. The three incidents were joined 
in the political and popular imaginations of many in the City and raised 
questions about the costs, potential harms, and the consequences of the 
new policing that are still debated today. Proponents of the new policing 
in New York argued that the crime control returns were significant and 
uniquely attributable to SQF or to other policing strategies that were 
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implemented simultaneously. These included aggressive enforcement of a 
variety of low- level misdemeanor laws and non- Penal Law sections of the 
administrative code, arrests for possession of small amounts of marijuana, 
and other ‘disorder’ offenses (Maple and Mitchell 2000). Others simply 
saw a more efficient and better managed police force that maximized its 
ample patrol strength and other resources through technological innova-
tion and accountability reforms (see, e.g., Zimring 2011).
A small number of studies have examined specific aspects of these strat-
egies. Two studies focused on misdemeanor arrests (Corman and Mocan 
2005; Rosenfeld et al., 2007). Several studies examined the unique crime 
control effects of SQF (Smith and Purtell 2007; Rosenfeld and Fornango 
2014; MacDonald et al. 2015; Fagan 2016; Weisburd et al. 2016). Others 
examined policing as a vector of tactics under a larger strategic initiative 
(Fagan 2010). Two studies compared New York’s crime decline to declines 
in other cities and failed to identify a comparative advantage (Rosenfeld 
et al. 2005; Harcourt and Ludwig 2007). Zimring’s recent book (2011) 
reaches the opposite conclusion, and suggests that sustained crime decline 
from 1994 to the present is in fact attributable to the vector of initiatives 
that together formed the new policing in New York.6
Overall, this body of evidence generally disagrees about the strength 
and direction of any returns to crime control from these practices, either 
individually or collectively (Meares 2014). This ambiguity in the social 
science evidence about street policing in New York offered little guidance 
to inform policy and practice throughout the two decades of SQF. And 
contentious litigation over SQF that spanned more than a decade has 
sustained the conflict over SQF (Daniels et al. v City of New York 2004; 
Floyd et al. v City of New York 2013). The intersection of tragic events, 
court battles and conflicting evidence contributed to the ambivalence and 
cynicism toward policing strategies, including in the communities that 
are most heavily policed and where crime rates have fallen most (Tyler 
et al. 2014).
1.3 Balancing Tests
However important this cost- benefit debate may be to policy and perhaps 
in litigation, it is not our concern in this chapter. The failure persuasively 
to identify unique effects of the new policing in New York has created a 
space, still quite open, where questions are vigorously debated about the 
costs and secondary consequences of the OMP strategy and the new polic-
ing in New York generally.
New Yorkers were not alone in raising these concerns. The sheer scope 
of high discretion, involuntary police- initiated contact lends some urgency 
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to their concerns. In 2005, police stopped – involuntarily – more than one 
in ten adult citizens over the age of 16, either on highways or in pedestrian 
encounters, across the US (Durose et al. 2007). Once stopped, citizens 
were subject to a search of their person, their belongings, their vehicle, or 
all three. Many of the searches are harsh, and in the national data, about 
10 percent of those stopped thought the officer acted improperly, includ-
ing the use of force or restraints that respondents thought unnecessary 
(Durose et al. 2007). The cumulative effect of these developments is the 
widespread use of coercive police authority to conduct ‘field interroga-
tions’ without a regulatory or normative system to justify or balance crime 
control returns. One of our core concerns in this essay is that the harm that 
accrues from these stops has the potential to corrode ties between citizens 
and law, ultimately compromising public safety as well as the safety of 
police officers (Tyler and Fagan 2008; Epp et al. 2014).
The debate in New York joins this broader nationwide debate about how 
policing shapes the attitudes of citizens, what types of policing enhances 
the legitimacy of policing and criminal legal institutions more generally, 
and whether legitimacy matters – beyond its civic virtues – as an engine of 
public safety (Skogan and Frydl 2004). For police officials, these debates 
affect how the police can manage street stops to make officers behave rea-
sonably and lawfully on the ground. We hope, as did a National Academy 
of Sciences report on policing (Skogan and Frydl 2004), that police will be 
concerned in turn with whether their tactics produce legitimacy.
So, our concern in this chapter is with the effects of SQF policing on 
public trust and confidence in the police, and whether SQF tactics build or 
undermine legitimacy. These issues have become a central feature of con-
temporary theory, policy and practice in policing (President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing 2015). Our claim is that both the substance and 
procedure of how stops are conducted in New York have costs for legiti-
macy, and that the legitimacy deficits that ensue have negative effects on 
public safety. Our focus recognizes that public trust and confidence in the 
police compete with legality, equity, efficiency and crime control efficacy 
as dimensions on which to evaluate policing. The legitimacy of OMP and 
other forms of proactive policing is an important question at this juncture, 
both in New York and elsewhere in the US, given the general embrace of 
proactive policing among US law enforcement agencies (Sampson and 
Cohen 1988; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Kubrin et al. 2010), and the central-
ity of Terry stops as an essential tool of policing (Heymann 2000; Fagan 
2016). For example, Kubrin et al. suggest that proactive policing can 
reduce the incidence of robberies, a bellwether crime in the US. Proactive 
strategies (and even predictive strategies) generally are now viewed favora-
bly by law enforcement, even if there is disagreement on what ‘dosages’ 
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are appropriate. The diffusion of these strategies can replicate the patterns 
of citizen–police interactions that gave rise to the tensions in New York.
The breach in trust between citizens and police dovetails with long-
standing racial grievances between minority citizens and police, as distrust 
has historically been and remains today much higher among minority 
group members (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Lerman and Weaver 2014). 
Studies consistently show that African- Americans are 20–30 percent less 
likely to express confidence in the police and that this difference has not 
disappeared in recent years. A recent study by the Pew Research Center 
(Kohut et al. 2007) found that African Americans were 29 percent less 
likely to express confidence that local law enforcement will enforce the 
law; 29 percent less confident that the police would not use excessive force 
when dealing with the public; and 30 percent less confident that the police 
treat all races equally.
Recent studies also show that specific policing practices contribute to 
poor ratings by citizens of the legitimacy of law enforcement. Interviews 
with young urban residents show that stop and search practices, coupled 
with frequent arrests for low- level public- order offenses, are widely viewed 
as unjust because they are insensitive, harsh or racially selective and 
potentially based upon prejudice (Brunson 2007; Brunson and Weitzer 
2009; Gau and Brunson 2010). As we show later in this essay, aggressive 
and proactive policing practices tend to reduce compliance and voluntary 
cooperation with law enforcement (Collins 2007; Delgado 2008; Howell 
2009). The damage can be especially great when street sweeps or arrests 
for ‘loitering’ bear down on minority youths. The views of children and 
adolescents about law and the courts are shaped by many factors, includ-
ing parents, teachers, gangs and the media. But one key issue is personal 
interactions with the police (Fagan and Tyler 2005; Fagan and Piquero 
2007). Because adult orientations toward the law are often formed during 
adolescence, these precursors of adult attitudes are crucial.
1.4 This Chapter
These concerns are the focus of this chapter. We begin with a review of the 
range of potentially adverse reactions or harms that SQF or ‘street’ polic-
ing may produce. We next link those harms to a broader set of normative 
concerns that connect dignity, harm and legitimacy. In the third section 
we review the evidence that connects citizen views of police – as well as 
their experience with police – to their perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
police and criminal legal institutions generally. In that same section, we 
review the evidence that links those perceptions to how citizens behave 
with respect to law, and identify the consequences of adverse reactions of 
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citizens to harsh forms of street policing. Finally, we discuss alternative 
frameworks for thinking about the regulation and control of the new 
policing, a discussion that has longstanding roots in a broader dialogue 
about the management of police discretion.
2.  DIGNITY AND INDIGNITY IN ORDER 
MAINTENANCE POLICING
2.1 Cumulative Harms of SQF
The late Bill Stuntz, in an essay commenting on SQF tactics as a form of 
Terry stops, pointed out that ‘street policing’ has large, complicated and 
misunderstood social and psychological effects on the persons subject 
to that particular form of police authority. He wrote this piece in early 
1998 shortly after the Louima incident but nearly a year before the Diallo 
shooting. He made it clear that he was talking about the aggressive police 
tactics that characterized the new policing in New York, though he also 
said that his claims were generalizable to the ‘new policing’ that had 
emerged in the decade. Like the architects of the OMP and SQF regimes, 
Bill acknowledged that such tactics would signal to would- be offenders 
that police are in control of the streets and those streets would be safe for 
ordinary citizens. But he also acknowledged that these tactics could signal 
broad- based and automatic suspicion based on status (gender, race, neigh-
borhood), and that the police could therefore be seen as a hostile presence 
in these neighborhoods.
He also had a cogent and coherent answer to the question of why there 
was there so much anger in the Black and Latino communities (and, 
without saying so, why there was so little anger in the City’s wealthiest and 
whitest neighborhoods where stops were less common for their residents). 
He identified a range of potential harms that might arise from widespread 
and routine stops of citizens at very low levels of suspicion of both serious 
and minor crimes, and even suspicion of non- criminal violations such as 
open containers of alcohol.
The first harm is the invasion of a person’s privacy. Privacy is a much- 
debated question in Fourth Amendment law, especially in the electronic 
and digital era, and it often is subject to various balancing tests that weigh 
an individual’s privacy interest against the context in which the interests 
of criminal justice might trump a person’s right not to be stopped or 
searched.7 But privacy does matter, and is an essential part of one’s sense 
of personal dignity. Losing some or all of one’s dignity arouses emotions – 
anger, humiliation, perhaps rage. So, since much of what we are concerned 
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with is the immediate if not residual emotional aftermath of experiencing 
involuntary and coercive police contact, the effects of aggressive policing 
on dignity are a salient and animating feature in the discourse on SQF. So, 
the coercive incursion on one’s person or property or even identity robs 
the citizen of the twin dignities of autonomy and privacy (Colb 1998).
Second is ‘targeting harm’. Targeting harm arises when a person is 
stopped by the police for some indicia of suspicion that may not be 
obvious to that citizen, or that is vague even to the police officer making 
the stop (see our data in NYC, for example). A person who is stopped 
often feels (and I emphasize feel) singled out in public by the police and 
treated like a criminal suspect. The fact that so few stops are accurate 
ensures the spread of the denial of the dignity of innocence, and especially 
among citizens in the more powerless communities.
The first two types of harm are often joined. This type of compound 
injury is best understood by asking why me? Why would an official use 
her discretion to single one out from others absent a valid and proper 
evidentiary basis? Why would s/he have a ‘hunch’ that one is a criminal? 
Targeting harm, then, encompasses both an innocence harm plus the pro-
cedural indignity of being targeted as criminal with what appears to the 
person stopped to be more of a hunch or an assumption than a reasonable 
basis. Since accuracy is so bad (most people are let go without a formal 
legal sanction), this cost almost always falls on the innocent.
Interviews with persons stopped show that these interactions arouse 
emotions, including subjective feelings of humiliation and rage that result 
from the feeling of being targeted – of being singled out as a criminal. 
Being stopped by the government in a public space also suggests public dis-
counting of worth (Harris 1999; Epp et al. 2014). It appears to the person 
stopped to be a form of public shaming that derives from the feeling that 
the state has no problem displaying its power and control over the citizen 
on a public stage (Capers 2009). The emotion may be compounded when 
the stop and frisk is conducted in public in front of peers and neighbors.8
Moreover, the resulting stigma has potential consequences for mental 
health and behavior (Geller et al. 2014). Link and Phelan define stigma 
through four interrelated components: (a) distinguishing and labeling 
human differences; (b) cultural beliefs that link labeled persons to negative 
stereotypes (such as ‘criminal’); (c) categorization that separates labeled 
persons from ‘us’ as ‘them’, leading to disapproval, rejection, exclusion; 
and (d) status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes for 
labeled persons (Link and Phelan 2001).9 In the context of SQF policing, 
these components are likely to be observed through the process of identify-
ing who will be frisked or searched. If the stigmatization process is strong 
in its ‘dosage’, ongoing surveillance of people in specific areas – and the 
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stress of anticipating that it could happen again at any time – can elevate 
risks for stress and emotional instability. Moreover, anger at stigma’s 
inherent downward placement in a power relationship might provoke 
harsher police responses leading to arrest and jail, as well as physical 
injury. The stereotypes of the persons selected for stops will likely shape 
both the tenor of the encounter and its outcome. The power difference 
between the police and the persons who are frisked is enormous, leaving 
little doubt whose labels, stereotypes and preferences to categorize and 
discriminate will hold sway.10
The third harm flows from the racial bias in the distribution of these 
incursions: the signaling of suspicion and assignment of criminality to 
Black citizens simply because they are Black or move about in a Black 
neighborhood. The racial distribution, over and above what any geo-
graphic difference in crime rates would predict, is a fact on the ground 
(Gelman et al. 2007; Fagan 2010, 2012; Fagan et al. 2010; Ridgeway and 
MacDonald 2010; Fagan et al. 2012). As a regulatory matter, recent data 
show that there are more stops per reported crime in minority neighbor-
hoods than in White or wealthy areas.
When stops are racialized in these ways, the harm is further com-
pounded by reinforcing the racial grievances a person may hold after prior 
experiences with discrimination. In other words, harm is compounded 
by a sense that this is a form of state power that is exercised principally 
against minorities, far more than against Whites (and this perception 
holds true even after Black citizens are reminded that serious crime rates 
are often higher in their neighborhoods). The Terry court observed that 
body frisks are humiliating, but scholarly analyses of Terry over the three 
decades scrubbed race from its meaning.11 It was not until the 1990s that 
the racial contours of police interdictions procedures were acknowledged 
in Whren, only to be dismissed by holding that the 4th amendment is not 
the appropriate framework for adjudicating these claims.
Fourth is the indignity of verbal and physical force that accompanies 
a search, as well as the fear of injury. Stops are rarely, if ever, neutral or 
benign. In New York, where there were more than 680 000 Terry stops in 
2011, some force is routine. From 2004 to 2010, there was physical contact 
in 23 percent of cases, and contact with restraint (beyond merely a placing 
of hands on the suspect) in 8 percent of cases. Suspects are handcuffed 
in 3 percent of all stops, including cases where there was no suspicion by 
officers that a weapon might be present.12 Frisks were made in 38 percent 
of stops when there was no overt suspicion that the suspect was engaged in 
violence or in possession of a weapon. Force also is racialized: while police 
rarely draw weapons on suspects, police in New York were 20 percent 
more likely to draw a weapon on a Black suspect compared to a White 
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suspect, regardless of whether the suspected crime involved either weapons 
or violence.
These four harms are not separate either: the indignity of inaccurate 
police incursions on liberty is compounded by the mix of these harms 
within any single interaction. Harsh treatment, as we discuss below, 
compounds the second and third harms – the assault on the dignity of 
innocence – by signaling the predicate of suspicion that seems to have 
motivated an unjustified police interdiction.
2.2 Legitimacy and Procedural Justice
Stuntz’s discussion raises an important dimension in a debate that often 
is stripped of its salience: these encounters have emotional freight, and 
the emotions matter well beyond the incident itself. They accumulate, 
and they are the moving parts in the explanation of how interactions can 
produce legitimacy or turn legitimacy into cynicism and withdrawal. That 
is, these interactions matter a great deal as evidence of legitimacy.
First, it’s important to clarify what we mean by legitimacy, and then 
proceed to the ways in which the everyday conduct of SQF can affect 
legitimacy and law- related behavior. Legitimacy is a term with many 
meanings in different contexts. When we use the term ‘legitimacy’ we 
mean a property that a rule or an authority has when others feel obligated 
to voluntarily defer to that rule or authority. A legitimate authority is 
one that is regarded by people as entitled to have its rules and decisions 
accepted and followed by others (Tyler 2011: 34; see also Skogan and 
Frydl 2004; Beetham 1991).
So, when we refer to legitimacy, we are not aiming for a philosophical 
justification of when people ought to defer to authorities; rather, our claim 
is descriptive in that we examine here whether people do defer (or at least 
say that they do).13 A robust body of social- science evidence from around 
the world shows that people are more likely to obey the law voluntarily 
when they believe that authorities have the moral authority as well as the 
legal basis to tell them what to do (Tyler et al. 2008). This research dem-
onstrates that people typically are motivated to comply with the law more 
by the belief that the authorities with whom they are dealing are legitimate 
than they are by fear of punishment (Tyler 1997, 2011).
Legitimacy in turn is linked to whether the authorities treat people 
with dignity and fairness when exercising authority, i.e. whether they 
are procedurally fair. People tend to place much more weight on how 
authorities exercise power as opposed to the ends for which that power 
is exercised – i.e. on the procedural justice through which the police 
exercise their authority. This is true across a wide variety of authorities. 
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Researchers have studied public evaluations of police officers, judges, 
political leaders, managers and teachers, and the findings are consistent; 
conclusions regarding legitimacy are tied more closely to judgments of the 
fairness of actions than to evaluations of the fairness, or effectiveness, of 
the outcomes (Tyler 2004). Rather than being primarily concerned with 
outcomes and individual maximization of utility, legitimacy- based com-
pliance is centered upon individual identity and is relational, positing that 
people tend to seek a favorable social identity within the groups to which 
they belong. People also seek a favorable social status for their group vis- 
à- vis other groups. In some studies, procedural justice is more important 
than either the valence or the fairness of the outcome of the experience. So, 
the police can most effectively build and maintain legitimacy by policing in 
ways consistent with public views about procedural justice.
Procedural justice can be understood in terms of four dimensions. First, 
people want to have an opportunity to explain their situation or tell their 
side of the story in a conflict. This opportunity to make arguments and 
present evidence should occur before the police make decisions about 
what to do. They are interested in having a forum in which they can tell 
their story, i.e. they want to have a voice.
Second, people react to evidence that the authorities with whom they 
are dealing are unbiased. This involves making decisions based upon 
consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the case, not on an 
officer’s personal opinions and biases. Even if officers are acting without 
bias, they may be perceived as making decisions unfairly by those they are 
dealing with, and it is important for the police to provide evidence leading 
the people they are dealing with to understand the basis of their actions. 
For this reason, transparency or openness about how decisions are being 
made facilitates the belief that decision- making procedures are neutral 
when police conduct makes it apparent that decisions are being made in 
rule- based and unbiased ways. In the case of street stops, this involves 
explaining why people are being stopped, i.e. what police policies and 
goals are involved.
Third, people are sensitive to whether they are treated with dignity and 
politeness, and to whether their rights as citizens are respected. The issue 
of interpersonal treatment consistently emerges as a key factor in reactions 
to dealings with legal authorities. People believe that they are entitled to 
treatment with respect and react very negatively to dismissive or demean-
ing interpersonal treatment.
Finally, people focus on behavioral cues that communicate information 
about the intentions and character of the legal authorities with whom they 
are dealing (‘their trustworthiness’). People react favorably to the judg-
ment that the authorities with whom they are interacting are benevolent 
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and caring, and are sincerely trying to do what is best for the people with 
whom they are dealing. Authorities communicate this type of concern 
when they listen to people’s accounts and explain or justify their actions 
in ways that show an awareness of and sensitivity to people’s needs and 
concerns.
2.3 How Much Do Legitimacy and Procedural Justice Matter?
Research on legitimacy and procedural justice provides a set of consist-
ent results about these relationships. The evidence includes panel studies 
with community samples (Tyler and Fagan 2008) and with samples of 
high- risk offenders during the transitional years from late adolescence to 
early adulthood (Fagan and Piquero 2007). Cross- sectional studies with 
adolescents (Fagan and Tyler 2005) and community samples of adults 
(Tyler and Sunshine 2003) show the same. Other evidence from criminal 
or juvenile justice samples includes Blader and Tyler (2003a, 2003b), 
Tyler and Huo (2002), Tyler and Wakslak (2004), Bradford, Jackson and 
Stanko (2009), Sprott and Greene (2010), Weitzer and Tuch (2004) and 
Engel (2005). Others have questioned either the validity of the constructs 
(Reisig et al. 2007) or the core principle that procedure trumps outcomes 
in citizen evaluations of police encounters (Skogan 2006). These studies 
tell the following story.
1. Citizens in involuntary police–citizen encounters will positively rate the 
legitimacy of police intervention and voluntarily defer to decisions made 
by police officers, accepting those decisions willingly, when they perceive 
that the encounters are procedurally fair (Tyler and Huo 2002). What is 
found to shape willingness to accept police decisions? People are more 
willing to accept police decisions when they received outcomes they 
judged to be favorable, or at least neutral. However, they are most 
strongly influenced by procedural fairness. This includes whether or 
not they evaluate police decision making to be fair and/or whether or 
not they evaluate the police as treating them fairly. In other words, 
the key issue shaping acceptance is procedural justice, i.e. the manner 
in which the police exercise their authority, not the favorability of the 
outcome. And, in particular, people paid attention to their interper-
sonal treatment by the police. This procedural fairness influence is 
five to six times as strong as the influence of outcomes (Tyler and Huo 
2002).
2. Procedural fairness is central to the reactions of people of all the eth-
nicities studied – Whites, African- Americans and Hispanics – to their 
personal experiences with the police. Although minor differences in 
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the issues of concern within varying ethnic groups can be identified, 
the overall finding is that people of all groups want basically the 
same thing – procedural fairness – when dealing with the police. And, 
when we distinguish between quality of decision making and quality 
of interpersonal treatment it is the quality of interpersonal treatment 
that emerges as central in the personal experiences that minority 
group members have with legal authorities.
  Procedural justice research findings make several points relevant 
to street stops. The first is that interactions with the police in which 
nothing legally important happens can have a strong influence upon 
the people involved. Even if a street stop does not result in an arrest or 
incarceration, it may still have a strong impact upon the views that the 
person has about the police. In particular, harassment or disrespect 
during the stop undermines legitimacy even if the duration of the stop 
is brief.
3. The police will gain deference from the public and cooperation in their 
efforts to prevent and solve crimes when the public views their actions 
as legitimate. People in encounters with legal authorities are more 
likely voluntarily to obey the law when they believe that authorities 
have the right to tell them what to do (Tyler et al. 2008). This research 
demonstrates that people typically are motivated to comply with the 
law more by the belief that the authorities with whom they are dealing 
are legitimate than they are by fear of punishment (Tyler 1997).
4. Legitimacy promotes both compliance with both major and minor 
legal rules and cooperation with legal authorities, especially the police. 
Accordingly, one implication is that when police generate good feel-
ings in their everyday contacts, it turns out people also are motivated 
to help them fight crime (Tyler 2011; Tyler and Fagan 2008). All of 
this leads to lower crime rates. This also suggests that it is possible 
to deal with the public and even deliver negative outcomes such as 
a ticket or an arrest without undermining legitimacy, if the police 
conduct themselves in ways that people view as fair. Studies of street 
stops in New York City suggest that among those people who received 
a negative outcome but evaluated the police as acting through fair 
procedures, both legitimacy and willingness to cooperate increased 
following an interaction with the police. In fact, procedural justice is 
more important in building legitimacy than two other dimensions of 
citizen views of the police: citizens’ evaluations of how effective police 
are in fighting crime, and the favorability for them of the outcome of 
a particular interaction or set of interactions.
  The important lesson is that regulation and legitimacy do not have 
to be traded off. The police can enforce the law and build legitimacy 
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at the same time. The key is to frame interactions using the principles 
of procedural justice. People tend to place much more weight on 
how authorities exercise power as opposed to the ends for which that 
power is exercised – i.e. on the procedural justice through which the 
police exercise their authority. This is true across a wide variety of 
authorities. Researchers have studied public evaluations of police 
officers, judges, political leaders, managers and teachers, and the find-
ings are consistent; conclusions regarding legitimacy are tied more 
closely to judgments of the fairness of actions than to evaluations of 
fairness, or effectiveness, of the outcomes (Tyler 2004).
5. Procedural justice works through a set of distinct processes. First is 
the importance of giving citizens voice in their interactions with 
police, or having a chance to tell their side of the story. Next is the 
management of targeting harm. Being singled out for reasons of 
bias – whether racial, or gender, or even neighborhood affiliation – 
corrodes legitimacy. A little transparency goes a long way. Third is 
being treated with respect and dignity. Dignity, apart from respect, 
is perhaps best observed in the breach. The persistence of indigni-
ties when no wrongdoing is detected can grow into fundamental 
problems of social exclusion, ushering in a profound sense of loss of 
recognition or respect and worthlessness. In his work on the self and 
the importance of recognition, Charles Taylor argues that our identi-
ties are deeply moral, that we understand ourselves as moral entities. 
(Taylor 1989). In Taylor’s view, indignities confer a harsh status: 
those who suffer indignities have weaker moral claims to recognition 
and respect.
6. Procedural fairness is understood by the way in which police signal their 
intent in a stop. It matters whether police encounters are intended to 
produce a general social good (seeking justice) or to maximize punish-
ment regardless of blameworthiness. Lind and Tyler (1992) explain 
that people care about procedural justice because it provides them 
with important informational signals that they view as relevant to their 
identities (Lind and Tyler 1988). For example, if  a police officer treats 
a person rudely during an encounter, that person will process that 
treatment as information relevant to how legal authorities tend to view 
her, as well as the group to which she belongs. The conclusion will be 
a negative one.
In a study of the subjective experience of being profiled in any manner, 
Tyler and Wakslak (2004) show that the judgments that people make 
about police fairness affect whether the people dealing with the police 
believe they have been profiled in the first place. Those who believe the 
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police are neutral are less likely to feel profiled. Additionally, those whose 
encounters with police are characterized by respectful, polite treatment 
and acknowledgement of rights also are much less likely to believe they 
have been profiled. And, we hope not surprisingly at this point, those who 
trust the motives of police are less likely than those who do not to believe 
that profiling has occurred (Lind and Tyler 1988). In other words, people’s 
inferences about why they have been stopped are based in large part on 
how they see the officers involved exercising their authority. If officers 
listen to people, explain the basis of their actions, treat them respectfully 
and acknowledge people’s concerns in the situation, they are trusted and 
viewed as acting professionally. If not, they are viewed as acting based 
upon animus toward whatever potentially stigmatizable group the person 
is from (i.e. young, minority, male).
2.4 Emotion
This brings us back to the question of emotion. Even interactions with 
the police in which nothing legally important happens can have a strong 
influence upon the people involved when the interaction is conducted 
in a way that loads it with emotional freight. Even if a street stop does 
not result in an arrest or incarceration or use of force, it may still have 
a strong impact upon the views that the person has about the police and 
about the laws they enforce. When police make a mistake, they unlaw-
fully deprive a citizen of her physical liberty as well as her dignity, in some 
cases risking a wrongful conviction if the mistake is neither detected nor 
corrected (Logan 2012).14 From there, the harms of a criminal conviction 
can spiral, including economic, social and psychological costs (Pager 
2007).
The mistake can also proceed to further harms as the situational 
dynamics unfold through a series of both social and symbolic interactions 
in which the ends are often contingent on decisions made during inter-
mediate transactions that take place throughout an encounter (Ogletree 
2012). In other words, someone can get hurt, if not threatened, when the 
encounter accelerates through a sequence of negative interactions and 
exchanges. The Henry Louis Gates incident is an important case study of 
the spiraling of an incident from a low- level indignity to a quite serious one 
in which both police and citizen incurred emotional baggage and stigma 
costs (Harcourt 2004; Ogletree 2012).
Putting it plainly, people get angry in these incidents, and the anger 
shapes their perceptions of all the elements of procedural fairness in the 
incident. Anger and arousal can skew both perceptions and behavior, so 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the person who believes she or he is 
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unfairly stopped or treated badly once stopped will form a negative view 
of the interaction and of the actors that led up to it. Anger aggregates 
across populations and through information markets in which knowledge 
about one person’s interaction with police quickly spreads through a com-
munity. This can work in two ways, one that spreads the emotion of the 
negative interaction vicariously across populations who believe that their 
fates are shared (Fagan and Meares 2008); or as a deterrent that will place 
would- be offenders on notice that they may be subject to stop and search 
with little provocation. Certainly, the latter is one of the hopes of the SQF 
regime, and its potential deterrent effects are celebrated as one reason for 
the City’s low crime rate (MacDonald 2013).15
We don’t know how people aggregate these emotional experiences, 
nor how they weigh and balance their reactions when they have had both 
positive and negative experiences with police. Still, one may imagine that 
negative or harsh interactions may weigh more heavily emotionally than 
do positive ones (Skogan and Frydl 2004). That certainly seems to be the 
case when it comes to the outcomes of encounters, so it is reasonable to 
assume that the same imbalance will be evident for procedural evalua-
tions. Since anger can lead to arousal, the emotional aftermath of a police 
encounter and the footprints it leaves will most likely reinforce the percep-
tion of legitimacy or illegitimacy to which the encounter gives rise. In other 
words, procedural justice represents not just a cognitive evaluation of how 
people are treated during an interaction but a vector of emotions that 
churns those perceptions and links them to other events in their cognitive 
landscape.
The other side of the coin should be obvious as well: positive interac-
tions are reinforcing. They instill a positive view of the decision maker. 
They signal that the interests and values – even morals – of the decision 
maker are aligned with the subject of her or his authority – the citizen. This 
builds trust in the police and identification with the police. In our work, 
trust and identification are important contributors to legitimacy.
Emotion matters in thinking about the views of legitimacy that police 
officers develop based on their experiences both as workers in a complex 
workplace and as enforcers of law. In one case, they are the subordinates, 
while in the latter, they wield power and control over subordinate citizens. 
The emotions behind procedural justice and legitimacy apply to police 
officers in both these circumstances. For example, a recent experiment 
showed that under conditions of ambiguous or negative referent power, 
police may experience emotional anxiety and fear for their physical safety 
(Goff et al. 2010). In other circumstances, routine indignities in the police 
workplace also produce stress and undermine the perceived legitimacy of 
the institution in which they serve.
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A different example shows that police may react to arbitrary power in 
the same way that citizens do when they are policed: with ambivalence 
about the institution, and resistance or hostility toward the rules of that 
institution. For example, research about police stress shows that the 
basic indignities of the police workplace – weak support from brass, arbi-
trary decision making, poor working conditions, irrational disciplinary 
 decisions – are stronger contributors to stress among police officers than 
are the details of the job including witnessing injuries, deaths or other 
potentially traumatic events (Liberman et al. 2002).
Police who attempt to violate the rigid power lines of the subordinate 
or the authority under the SQF regime also suffer at the hands of their 
superiors, and experience the same alienation and anger as do citizens 
who are subjected to the seeming arbitrary or punitive actions of the 
police. For example, four police officers were disciplined for playing 
football with youngsters in the Webster Houses in the Bronx at a 2010 
Fourth of July celebration. In addition to the substantive punishment 
of docking two days of vacation, the officers were publicly reprimanded 
in harsh and derogatory terms by their commanding officer on the scene 
(Robbins  2011).16 Rather than cultivating legitimacy and respect, the 
supervising officer signaled to the residents in the area that a rigid line of 
authority separates police and residents, and that the command hierarchy 
rejects efforts to foster reciprocal identification of residents and police. 
More importantly, an incident like this illustrates how mundane everyday 
indignities of the police workplace – both when police are subordinates 
and also when they wield power – can be corrosive both for police officers 
and the communities they patrol.
The structure of these emotional responses to being both power-
ful and powerless lies in the idea of referent power and its role in the 
perception and internalization of legitimacy. Much of the legitimacy 
and procedural justice literatures focuses on the perspective of the 
subordinate or the less powerful person (Beetham 1991; Smith 2007). 
There has been little work on the reactions of those who are asked to 
enforce norms or policies that they may view as illegitimate, and how 
this shapes referent power. Referent power is usually assessed as a basis 
of social power that requires deference and respect from subordinates to 
produce compliance (French and Raven 1953). Without referent power, 
those in power may doubt their perceived legitimacy and fairness as they 
confront lower compliance and respect from those with subordinate 
power. The demands on officers under SQF, like the demands of a dif-
ficult policing workplace, may lead to ambiguous formations of referent 
power, both from police roles as subordinates and from their roles as 
wielding power.
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3. THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE
When we say that people tend to evaluate the conduct of legal authori-
ties with respect to fairness as opposed to lawfulness, we are referring to 
these notions of legitimacy and procedural justice and to the relational 
connections between people and legal authorities that underlie them. The 
fact that people have a relational connection to legal authorities provides 
those authorities with an alternative basis for creating and maintaining 
their legitimacy that is not linked to the nature of the sanctions that they 
may use to enforce the law. So far, so good. It also provides a connection 
that creates a difficult and tense space between lawfulness and legality. 
This is the challenge for regulation: creating an institutional design where 
the pursuit of one dimension of policing works in a complementary and 
reciprocal way with the other that optimizes both. We offer two different 
and perhaps competing visions of a regulatory design that faces these 
challenges.
3.1 Adjusting the Thresholds for Police Contact
Terry stops are an important policing tool to prevent crime. But as that 
reliance skews, errors will increase and harms will pile up. This is not to 
say that the police should abandon the practice of Terry stops. Terry stops, 
after all, are lawful, and when carefully effected and narrowly applied, can 
have crime control benefits (Fagan 2016). What it does imply is that there 
is a trade- off to using this power too broadly.
The broad use of Terry stop power is encouraged by OMP regimes. 
Substantive criminal laws forbidding relatively harmless or benign behav-
iors can serve the police as a substitute for the authority to carry out Terry 
stops that require a higher level of suspicion (that ‘crime is afoot’) (Bowers 
2014). When the criminal law is broadly enforced, and when non- penal 
law violations are integrated with the overall mission of street policing to 
detect weapons and control violence, then the likelihood increases that 
both benign and serious crimes will be part of the umbrella of suspicion. 
The burden of proof in those administrative violations or low- level 
offenses is intrinsically lower and places Terry’s fundamental rules at risk.
Imagine that we have two types of acts – a benign act and a harmful one. 
Intervening in the relatively benign act, such as a violation of an adminis-
trative code, seems to benefit almost no one – there are few public benefits 
to crime control, since the range of harm is private. We may stop someone 
from smoking in public, or drinking from an open container, playing loud 
music in a residential area, or jumping turnstiles on public transit. We 
may signal ‘order’ by enforcing these laws, but their relationship to public 
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safety is path dependent on the questionable relationship between theories 
of social or physical disorder and crime (Harcourt 1998; Sampson and 
Raudenbush 1999). This may seem like an efficient use of a scarce public 
good – policing – if ‘hit rates’ (arrests, seizures of weapons or contraband) 
turn out to be high. But the yield for public safety is low if these low- level 
crimes are not gateways to violence or major property crimes.
More important, the standard of proof for those low- level crimes or 
violations is intrinsically low (Kaplow 2012). Intervening in the benign 
act, then, distracts from intervening in the more harmful one. It is only 
in the shared space between benign and harmful acts in which it makes 
sense to intervene in the benign act at a lower standard of proof. The size 
of that shared space and the appropriateness of state actions in that space 
is part of a contentious debate (Risse and Zeckhauser 2004; Durlauf 2006; 
Harcourt 2007). The risks of intervening in the shared space are Type I 
errors, or false positives, if in fact the space is dominated by benign acts 
with little chance of ripening into more harmful acts. But the other error, 
ignoring potentially more serious harms in that shared space, creates a dif-
ferent risk. That is, the social costs from undetected harmful acts will out-
weigh any private or small- scale benefits from intervening more broadly in 
the benign acts. Figure 8.1 illustrates this simple regulatory algebra.
Intervening to stop the harmful offense, which requires a higher 
standard of proof, has much greater benefit, and carries with it a greater 
likelihood of success (in terms of efficiency). In other words, if we agree 
that not only bad treatment but high error rates create harms, then these 
errors are more likely the more we lower the standard of evidence we 





Figure 8.1 Probability distributions for strength of evidence
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we go after more harmful acts, make fewer mistakes, and are more likely 
to ‘chill’ these acts. What we must trade- off is a greater tolerance for the 
minor ones.
But the real return on this design is in the reduction of harms, and in 
turn a more effective production of legitimacy. Assume we have a low 
standard of proof – we make mistakes, we exact liberty and dignity costs 
from citizens, and harms accrue. The harms accrue for both harmful and 
benign acts. But if we raise the level of proof required for a stop, we will 
gain in the efficiency of detecting harmful acts at the cost of tolerating or 
missing more benign ones. But we will be more accurate and make fewer 
errors. The dividend here is that fewer harms accrue, using the Stuntzian 
framework of harm. And if we perform these stops thoughtfully and 
respectfully, we expand the legitimacy dividend. In economic terms, we 
sacrifice the largely private benefits of enforcing laws prohibiting benign 
acts, for the greater social benefits of (a) getting the truly bad guys, and 
(b) policing with legitimacy to further leverage citizen cooperation and 
compliance. This requires that we pay close attention to the standards of 
proof that we use to apply the police power of the stop, and to the manner 
in which we conduct that stop. Legitimacy is a benefit, a public good, 
just as is the security that police help create. That public benefit should 
be equally available to everyone as a matter of both equity and political 
accountability. And, in turn, legitimacy should be equitably distributed 
across groups and areas, as are the other benefits of policing.
3.2 Lawfulness and Legality: Toward Rightful Policing
There is another path to legitimacy, and this requires some resolution of 
a tense relationship between lawfulness and legality. Imagine four points 
on a compass, as shown in Figure 8.2. If we array lawfulness from east to 
west, with lawfulness to the east and unlawfulness to the west, naturally 
we want and expect police to be as far east as they could possibly be. In 
the east, police should not undertake to arrest someone (or even stop 
them) unless there is a statute or ordinance indicating that the conduct in 
question is unlawful. They should not move to arrest or engage a person 
unless they have gathered enough facts to constitute the constitutionally 
required level of suspicion that the Fourth Amendment specifies. Once an 
encounter has begun, the officer should endeavor to follow every general 
order (administrative rule) relevant to the specific context, and so on.
Now imagine procedural justice or legitimacy as running north and 
south on our compass. When police comport themselves in ways that 
confer dignity on those with whom they interact and otherwise treat 
people with respect, we will say they are ‘headed north’. Examples here 
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include high- quality interpersonal treatment (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; 
Tyler and Fagan 2008; Geller et al. 2014); offering citizens an opportunity 
to tell their side of the story during an encounter (Tyler and Huo 2002); 
and being transparent about the reasons for the encounters and explaining 
in advance what will happen during the encounter, raising the probability 
that a citizen will conclude that the officer’s decisions are fact- based and 
neutral rather than arbitrary (Tyler et al. 2014). When an officer’s conduct 
is inconsistent with these yardsticks, we will categorize that behavior as 
‘running south’.
Putting the two parts together, we see that the best place for police to 
be is the northeast. That is where one will find rightful policing –  policing 
that is both lawful and procedurally just. We believe that a primary 
problem with street policing in urban cities such as New York, Chicago 
and Philadelphia is that they are examples of ‘southeastern’ behavior: 
police conduct that may be lawful, but also is perceived by the citizen on 
the other side of the encounter as deeply, deeply illegitimate, using the 
term the way we have defined it here.17 If this is right, then it means that 
any attempted strategy to both describe and remedy a problem that exists 
in multiple dimensions will fail if the proposed strategy is unidimensional.
This, we claim, is the fundamental problem with a strictly law- based 
approach that is agnostic or indifferent with respect to procedure and 
the emotions that matter. The law has no capacity as it is written today 
to tell police how to arrest or stop someone in a way that will tend to 
support police legitimacy. More than this, police are rarely trained in 








Figure 8.2 Lawful and legitimate policing
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spend  literally hours and hours reading law, learning when they are legally 
allowed to stop, arrest and search.18 They are not correspondingly trained 
about how to conduct themselves so as to create and maintain their legiti-
macy in the community. How we think about police in the end is a matter 
not just of legality but of conduct. By optimizing both, we maximize 
legitimacy and, in turn, a socially and civically productive methodology 
for public safety. That’s what’s lacking right now in New York and other 
cities in many parts of the world.
NOTES
 1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976). SQF 
is shorthand for stop, question and frisk, which is one of the many labels that 
both the City and other observers use to characterize the practice of Terry stops in 
New York.
 2. The Appendix shows the levels of suspicion and the permissible police intrusions at 
each level under New York law. See, People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976). See, also, 
U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
 3. The unit’s motto was ‘We Own the Night’. It was formed in 1971 and had fewer than 
100 officers until 1999.
 4. Allegations that the officers made inflammatory cries of ‘It’s Giuliani time’, celebrating 
the strong support for aggressive policing that then Mayor Giuliani had given to police, 
later proved to be unfounded.
 5. In 1999, Police Commissioner Howard Safir increased the size of the SCU from 100 to 
over 300, and redeployed them from borough- wide commands to local commands in 
precincts and other smaller tactical units. Although precise and reliable data are not 
available for that year, it is safe to assume that the SCU spearheaded the sharp increase 
in the number of New Yorkers who had contact with those units. It is also not unrea-
sonable, given the revelations in the Spitzer report two years later, that those encounters 
were unpleasant.
 6. Crime also declined by 10 percent in 1992–93, a period when NYPD patrol strength 
expanded by nearly 5000 officers following the passage of the Safe Streets Safe City 
legislation by the state legislature. See, Judith Greene (1999).
 7. The boundaries were set forth in Terry in 1968. Police were allowed to seize and detain 
a suspect based on their reasonable suspicion of a past or imminent future crime, and 
were allowed to conduct a patdown if the officer believed there was a threat to her 
personal safety.
 8. Though it also could earn the person who is frisked some status as having gotten under 
the skin of the police.
 9. Link and Phelan describe multiple mechanisms through which stigma can produce such 
consequences. Research on stigma in studies of animals and humans shows that exclu-
sion and devaluation by one’s peers can induce a stress response that wears on the body 
to produce pathogenesis. Efforts to avoid stigma can lead to coping orientations that 
backfire or harm, leading youth to reject the protection of the police or other authori-
ties when such protection is needed.
10. There also are potential mental health consequences from stigma. If the stigmatization 
is strong, the individual who is stopped (especially those stopped multiple times through 
ongoing surveillance) is subject to the stress of anticipating that it could happen again 
at any time. Also, stigma can demoralize. Downward placement in a separate category 
can erode initiative and autonomy, making the stigmatized person feel that he/she does 
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not belong and is not the kind of person who can succeed in the world that the police 
protect. See, e.g., Link et al. (1989, 1997).
11. For an exception, see Thompson (1999).
12. These were cases where the suspected crime was either a weapons offense or a violent 
offense. See, Fagan (2010). Actions to ensure the safety of officers are fundamental to 
Terry doctrine as well as to New York case law. However, the circumstances where 
restraint is used, which amounts to ‘seizure’ in most Fourth Amendment case law, are 
narrowly defined. The use of restraints such as handcuffs when there is no indication 
of danger to the officer or other immediate threats to public safety, or of flight, is 
not sanctioned. See, for example, People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976) and the 
Appendix.
13. Additionally, we mean to emphasize the public feeling of obligation as opposed to 
personal morality. It is true that personal morality has been shown to be an important 
motivator of compliance. However, voluntary deference resulting from public legiti-
macy is also powerful –especially as compared to deference resulting from fear of the 
potential imposition of formal punishment. For the seminal work on this point, see 
Tyler (1997).
14. For example, many defendants in NYC plead out rather than enduring repeated court 
appearances over long periods of time to clear their names of minor misdemeanor 
charges such as trespass or possession of small amounts of marijuana. Those appear-
ances often require missing work with attendant economic loss (Glaberson 2013; Levine 
and Small 2008).
15. ‘The best thing for a person to do when being stopped is cooperate. Accept it as a fact 
of urban life’, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, March 2012.
16. The title of the website article refers to a recent incident where officers were videotaped 
dancing with sexual gestures during at the 2011 West Indian Day Parade on Labor 
Day. Those officers have yet to be disciplined. In the 2010 incident, Deputy Chief James 
McNamara, supervisor of the Bronx Housing Bureau, reportedly publicly and angrily 
chastised all four officers immediately following the incident.
17. Both Fagan (2010, 2012) and Rudovsky (Mahari Bailey et al. v. City of Philadelphia) 
have argued that many of the police stops in New York City and Philadelphia are, in 
fact, unlawful under our terms. We do not mean to gloss over this issue. Rather, we 
simply want to point out that it is likely that even if both cities are outliers compared 
to others regarding the lawfulness of the street encounters there, it remains true that 
the vast majority of the street stops in these two cities are lawful. And yet citizens are 
dissatisfied.
18. We canvassed several policing agencies across the country, including the departments in 
Boston, Chicago, New Haven and San Francisco. The number of hours rookies spend 
learning the law ranges from a high of 258 hours out of 1040 hours of total training in 
Boston (approximately 25 percent of training) to 98 hours out of a total 1184 hours 
of total training in San Francisco representing just over 8 percent of the total training 
hours.
REFERENCES
Beetham, David (1991) Legitimation of Power. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Blader, Steven L. and Tom R. Tyler (2003a) ‘A Four- component Model of 
Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process’. 29(6) Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 747–758.
Blader, Steven L. and Tom R. Tyler (2003b) ‘What constitutes fairness in work 
settings? A four- component model of procedural justice’. 12 Human Resource 
Management Review 107–126.
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   225 06/06/2016   13:09
226 Comparing the democratic governance of police intelligence
Bobo, Lawrence and Devon Johnson (2004) ‘A Taste for Punishment: Black and 
White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs’. 1 Du 
Bois Review 151–180.
Bowers, Josh (2014) ‘Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness and the 
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity”’. 66 Stanford Law Review 
2013–2024.
Bradford, Ben, Jonathan Jackson and Elizabeth A. Stanko (2009) ‘Contact and 
Confidence: Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police’. 19(1) 
Policing & Society 20–46.
Bratton, William J. with Peter Knobler (1998) The Turnaround: How America’s 
Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic. New York: Random House.
Brunson, Rod K. (2007) ‘“Police Don’t Like Black People”: African- American 
Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences’. 6(1) Criminology and Public 
Policy 71–102.
Brunson, Rod K. and Ronald Weitzer (2009) ‘Police Relations with Black and 
White Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods’. 44 Urban Affairs Review 
858–885.
Capers, I. Bennett (2009) ‘Policing, Race and Place’. 44 Harvard Civil Rights- Civil 
Liberties Law Review 43–78.
Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Colb, Sherry F. (1998) ‘The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness”’. 98 Columbia Law Review 1642–1725.
Collins, Reed (2007) ‘Strolling While Poor: How Broken- Windows Policing 
Created a New Crime in Baltimore’. 14 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 419, 426.
Corman, Hope and Naci Mocan (2005) ‘Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows’. 48 
Journal of Law and Economics 235–266.
Dawson, Michael (1995) Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African- American 
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Delgado, Richard (2008) ‘Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: 
Innovation and Response’. 106 Michigan Law Review 1193–1212.
Daniels v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 1695, Dkt # 152 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2004).
Durlauf, Steven N. (2006) ‘Assessing Racial Profiling’. 116 The Economic Journal 
F402–F420.
Durose, Matthew, Erica Smith and Patrick Langan (2007) Contacts between 
Citizens and Police, 2005. NCJ 215243. Washington DC: Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.
Engel, Robin Shepard (2005) ‘Citizens’ perceptions of distributive and procedural 
injustice during traffic stops with police’. 42(2) Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 445–481.
Epp, Charles R., Steven Maynard- Moody and Donald P. Haider- Markel (2014) 
Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
Fagan, Jeffrey (2002) ‘Race, Legitimacy, and Criminal Law’. 4 Souls 69–72.
Fagan, Jeffrey (2010) Expert Report, Floyd v City of New York, 08 Civ 01034(SAS), 
filed October 15, 2010.
Fagan, Jeffrey (2012) Second Supplemental Report, Floyd v City of New York, 08 
Civ 01034(SAS), November 29, 2012.
Fagan, Jeffrey (2016) ‘Terry’s Original Sin’. 2016 University of Chicago Legal 
Forum (forthcoming).
Fagan, Jeffrey and Garth Davies (2002) ‘Street Stops and Broken Windows: 
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   226 06/06/2016   13:09
 Street stops and police legitimacy in New York 227
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City’. 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
457–504.
Fagan, Jeffrey and Tracey L. Meares (2008) ‘Punishment, Deterrence and Social 
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities’. 6 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 173–229.
Fagan, Jeffrey and Alex R. Piquero (2007) ‘Rational Choice and Developmental 
Influences on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders’. 4 J. Empirical 
Leg. Stud. 715.
Fagan, Jeffrey and Tom Tyler (2005) ‘Legal Socialization of Children and 
Adolescents’. 18(3) Social Justice Research 217–241.
Fagan, Jeffrey, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies and Valerie West (2010) ‘Street 
Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: Race and Order Maintenance Policing 
in a Safe and Changing City’, in S. Rice and M. White (eds), Exploring Race, 
Ethnicity and Policing: Essential Readings. New York University Press, 309–348.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
French, John and Bertram Raven (1953) ‘The Bases of Social Power’, in 
D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds), Group Dynamics: Studies in Social Power. 
Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson; London: Tavistock Publications.
Gau, Jacinta and Rod K. Brunson (2010) ‘Procedural Justice and Order 
Maintenance Policing’. 27 Justice Quarterly 255–279.
Geller, Amanda, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom R. Tyler and Bruce G. Link (2014) 
‘Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men’. 104 
American Journal of Public Health 2321–2327.
Gelman, Andrew, Jeffrey Fagan and Alex Kiss (2007) ‘The Analysis of the New 
York City Police Department’s “Stop- and- Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims 
of Racial Bias’. 479 Journal of the American Statistical Association 813–823.
Glaberson, William (2013) ‘In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Wait for Elusive Trials’, 
New York Times, May 1, at A1.
Goff, Philip Atiba, Liana Epstein and K. Reddy (2010) ‘Safe Because We Are 
Fair: How Cross- Deputization Jeopardizes Law Enforcement’s Perceptions of 
Safety’. The Consortium for Police Leadership in Equity.
Greene, Judith A. (1999) ‘Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and 
Practices in New York City’. 45 Crime & Delinquency 171–187.
Harcourt, Bernard E. (1998) ‘Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social 
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order- 
Maintenance Policing New York Style’. 97 Michigan Law Review 291–389.
Harcourt, B.E. (2004) ‘Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective 
Responsibility’. 3 Criminology and Public Policy 363.
Harcourt, Bernard E. (2007) Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing 
in an Actuarial Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harcourt, Bernard E. and Jens Ludwig (2006) ‘Broken Windows: New Evidence 
from New York City and a Five- city Social Experiment’. 73 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 271–320.
Harcourt, Bernard E. and Jens Ludwig (2007) ‘Reefer Madness: Broken Windows 
Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000’. 
6(1) Criminology and Public Policy 165–182.
Harris, David. (1999) ‘The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters’. 84 Minnesota Law Review 265.
Heymann, Philip B. (2000) ‘The New Policing’. 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
407.
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   227 06/06/2016   13:09
228 Comparing the democratic governance of police intelligence
Howell, Babe K. (2009) ‘Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs 
of Aggressive Order- Maintenance Policing’. 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Chg. 271.
Kaplow, Louis (2012) ‘Burden of Proof ’. 121 Yale Law Journal 738.
Kocieniewski, David (1999) ‘Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the 
Streets’, New York Times, February 15, at A1.
Kocieniewski, David and Robert Hanley (2000) ‘Racial Profiling was the Routine, 
New Jersey Finds’, New York Times, November 28, at A1.
Kohut, Andrew et al. and Pew Research Center (2007) Blacks See Growing 
Values Gap Between Poor and Middle Class: Optimism about Black Progress 
Declines. Discussion Paper. Available at: http://pewsocialtrends.org/2007/11/13/
blacks- see- growing- values- gap- between- poor- and- middle- class/.
Kubrin, Charis E., Steven F. Messner, G. Deane, K. McGeever and T.D. Stucky 
(2010) ‘Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates across US Cities’. 48 Criminology 
57–98.
La Vigne, Nancy G., Pamela Lachman, Shebani Rao and Andrea Matthews 
(2014) Stop and Frisk: Balancing Crime Control with Community Relations 30. 
Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Lerman, Amy E. and Vesla M. Weaver (2014) Arresting Citizenship: The 
Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Levine, Harry G. and Deborah Peterson Small (2008) ‘Marijuana Arrest Crusade’. 
New York: New York Civil Liberties Union.
Liberman, Akiva, Suzanne R. Best, Thomas J. Metzler, Jeffrey Fagan, et al. (2002) 
‘Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police’. 2 Policing: 
An International Journal 421–439.
Lind, E. Allen and Tom R. Tyler (eds) (1988) The Social Psychology of Procedural 
Justice. New York: Plenum.
Lind, E. Allan and Tom R. Tyler (1992) ‘A relational model of authority in 
groups’. 25 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 115–192.
Link, Bruce G. and Jo C. Phelan (2001) ‘Conceptualizing Stigma’. 27 Annual 
Review of Sociology 363–385.
Link, Bruce G., Ernest Struening, Jo C. Phelan, L. Nuttbrock, et al. (1997) ‘On 
Stigma and its Consequences: Evidence From a Longitudinal Study of Men 
With Dual Diagnoses of Mental Illness and Substance Abuse’. 38 J. Health & 
Social Behavior 177–190.
Link, Bruce, Francis T. Cullen, Ernest Struening, P. Shrout and Bruce P. 
Dohrenwend (1989) ‘A Modified Labeling Theory Approach in the Area of 
Mental Disorders: An Empirical Assessment’. 54(3) Amer. Sociological Rev. 
400–423.
Logan, Wayne (2012) ‘Police Mistakes of Law’. 61 Emory L. J. 69–110.
Lynch, Timothy (2000) ‘We Own the Night: Amadou Diallo’s deadly encounter 
with New York City’s Street Crimes Unit’, Washington DC, CATO Institute 
Briefing Papers 56.
MacDonald, Heather (2002) ‘The Racial Profiling Myth Debunked’, 12 City 
Journal, available at http://www.city- journal.org/html/racial- profiling- myth- 
debunked- 9906.html
MacDonald, Heather (2013) ‘How to Increase the Crime Rate Nationwide’, Wall 
Street Journal, June 12, at A17.
MacDonald, John M., Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda Geller (2015) ‘The Effects of 
Local Crime Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City’, Presented at the 
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   228 06/06/2016   13:09
 Street stops and police legitimacy in New York 229
Tenth Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, St. Louis MO, October 2015, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2614058
Mahari Bailey et al. v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10- 5952, U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to the Court 
and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues, David 
Rudovsky, Counsel for Plaintiffs.
Maple, Jack and Christopher Mitchell (2000) The Crime Fighter: How You Can 
Make your Community Crime Free. New York: Broadway Books.
Meares, Tracey L. (2014) ‘The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk’. 10 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 335–352.
Ogletree, Charles (2012) Presumption of Guilt. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Pager, Devah (2007) Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass 
Incarceration. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976).
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) Final Report of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services.
Reisig, Michael D., Jason Bratton and Marc G. Gertz (2007) ‘The construct valid-
ity and refinement of process- based policing measures’. 34(8) Criminal Justice 
and Behavior 1005–1028.
Ridgeway, Greg and John MacDonald (2010) ‘Methods for Assessing Racially 
Biased Policing’, in Stephen K. Rice and Michael D. White (eds), Race, 
Ethnicity, and Policing. New York: New York University Press.
Risse, Mathias and Richard Zeckhauser (2004) ‘Racial Profiling’. 32 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 131–170.
Robbins, Christopher (2011) ‘NYPD: Dry- Humping Is OK, But Throwing 
Football Is Misconduct’, The Gothamist, September 19, at http://gothamist.
com/2011/09/19/nypd_dry- humping_ok_throwing_footba.php
Rosen, Jeffrey (2000) ‘Excessive Force – Why Patrick Dorismond Didn’t Have to 
Die’, New Republic, April 10, at 24.
Rosenfeld, Richard and Robert Fornango (2014) ‘The Impact of Police Stops 
on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003–2010’. 31(1) 
Justice Quarterly 96–122.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango and Eric Baumer (2005) ‘Did Ceasefire, 
CompStat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?’ 4 Criminology & Public Policy 419–449.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango and Andres F. Rengifo (2007) ‘The Impact 
of Order- maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery 
Rates: 1988–2001’. 45 Criminology 355–384.
Sampson, Robert J. and Jacqueline Cohen (1988) ‘Deterrent Effects of the Police 
on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension’. 22 Law and Society Review 
163–189.
Sampson, Robert J. and Stephen W. Raudenbush (1999) ‘Systematic 
Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban 
Neighborhoods’. 105 American Journal of Sociology 603–651.
Silverman, Eli B. (1999) NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing. 
Boston, MA: UPNE.
Skogan, Wesley G. (2006) ‘Asymmetry in the impact of encounters with police’. 
16(2) Policing & Society 99–126.
Skogan, Wesley and Kathleen Frydl (eds) (2004) Fairness and Effectiveness in 
Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   229 06/06/2016   13:09
230 Comparing the democratic governance of police intelligence
Smith, David I. (2007) ‘The Foundations of Legitimacy’, in Tom R. Tyler et al. 
(eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation Press, pp. 30–58.
Smith, Dennis C. and Robert Purtell (2007) ‘An Empirical Assessment of NYPD’s 
“Operation Impact”: A Targeted Zone Crime Reduction Strategy’. Available at: 
https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/impactzoning.doc.
Spitzer, Eliot (1999) The New York City Police Department’s Stop & Frisk 
Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York from the Office of the 
Attorney General. Albany, NY: DIANE Publishing.
Sprott, Jane B. and Carolyn Greene (2010) ‘Trust and Confidence in the Courts: 
Does the Quality of Treatment Young Offenders Receive Affect Their Views of 
the Courts?’ 56(2) Crime & Delinquency 269–289.
Stuntz, William J. (1998) ‘Terry’s Impossibility’. 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1216.
Taylor, Charles (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Thompson, Anthony (1999) ‘Stopping the Usual Suspects’. 74 NYU L Rev 
956–1013.
Tyler, Tom R. (1997) Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Tyler, Tom R. (2004) ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’. 593 The Annals 84–99.
Tyler, Tom R. (2011) Why People Cooperate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Tyler, Tom R. and Jeffrey Fagan (2008) ‘Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do 
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?’ 6 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 231–275.
Tyler, Tom R. and Y.J. Huo (2002) Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public 
Cooperation with the Police and Courts. New York: Russell Sage.
Tyler, Tom R. and Jason Sunshine (2003) ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’ 3 Law & Society Review 
513–548.
Tyler, Tom R. and Cheryl J. Wakslak (2004) ‘Profiling and Police Legitimacy: 
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority’. 
2 Criminology 253–281.
Tyler, Tom R., Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda B. Geller (2014) ‘Street Stops and Police 
Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization’. 
11 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 751–785.
Tyler, Tom R., Anthony Braga, Jeffrey Fagan, Tracey Meares, Robert Sampson 
and Chris Winship (eds) (2008) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International 
Perspectives. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation Press.
U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Weisburd, David, Alese Woodtich, Sarit Weisburd and Sue- Ming Yang (2016) 
‘Do Stop and Frisk Practices Deter Crime? Evidence at Microunits of Space and 
Time’. 15(1) Criminology and Public Policy 31–56.
Weitzer, Ronald and Steven A. Tuch (2004) ‘Race and perceptions of police mis-
conduct’. 51(3) Social Problems 305–325.
Zimring, Franklin E. (2011) The City that Became Safe. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
M4005 ROSS TEXT.indd   230 06/06/2016   13:09
 Street stops and police legitimacy in New York 231
APPENDIX
Table 8A.1  Permissible actions by police officers during stops under 
People v. DeBour
Predicate Permissible response
Level 1 Police Officer (P.O.) can ask non- threatening questions regarding  
  name, address, destination and, if person carrying something 
unusual, police officer can ask about that. Encounter should 
be brief and non- threatening. There should be an absence of 
harassment and intimidation.
P.O. can:
 ● say ‘STOP’ (If not ‘forceful’)
 ● approach a stopped car
 ● touch holster
P.O. cannot:
 ● request permission to search
 ●  cause people to reasonably believe they’re suspected of crime, 
no matter how calm and polite the tone of the questions
Level 2 P.O. can ask pointed questions that would reasonably lead one to  
  believe that he/she is suspected of a crime. Questions can be more 
extended and accusatory. Focus on possible criminality.
P.O. can:
 ● request permission to search
P.O. cannot:
 ● pursue
 ● forcibly detain
Level 3 P.O. can:
 ● forcibly detain
 ● frisk for weapons if in fear
 ● pull car out of traffic flow
 ● order defendant to lie on the ground
 ● handcuff (for good reason)
 ● pursue
Level 4 P.O. can arrest and search suspect
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